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Abstract 
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-
take-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which 
that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that 
proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner-take-all 
tournament. The proportional-prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which 
heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants, without altering the performance 
of stronger entrants. These findings could inform the design of contests for technological and 
other improvements, which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit 
more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities.  
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1. Introduction 
Government agencies and philanthropic donors often sponsor contests to reward socially 
desirable achievements, such as educational attainment or technological innovation.1 
Policymakers can also influence the value of rewards in private contests, by taxing or regulating 
the payoffs obtained from tournament-like competitions.2 In this paper, we use controlled 
experiments to compare the degree of effort and achievement elicited by two contrasting 
payment structures, in an otherwise identical contest with the same stakes. The vast majority of 
previous work on contest payments focuses on winner-take-all or rank-order tournaments with 
fixed prizes.3 Here, we contrast that traditional approach with an alternative contest design, in 
which payments are strictly proportional to measured achievement.   
Winner-take-all competition is widespread, often because achievement is inherently 
indivisible or because the contest sponsor wishes to create strong effort incentives by providing 
the greatest possible reward for winning. Examples include competitions for leadership 
positions, medical discoveries, or athletic records. Lazear and Rosen (1981) predict that winner-
take-all payments elicit greater maximum efforts when identical players pursue a fixed goal, but 
some contests in real life aim to attract diverse contestants whose efforts are cumulative. For 
example, a contest sponsor may wish to elicit greater educational achievement, environmental 
conservation, or productivity gains. Such competitions are not inherently winner-take-all, and 
their explicit goal may be to attract and reward the efforts of heterogeneous contestants. 
Recent theoretical and experimental studies have identified several limitations of winner-
                                                 
1 A comprehensive review of government and philanthropic contests is available from McKinsey and Company 
(2009); a database of technology prizes is provided in Masters and Delbecq (2008).   
2 Many governments impose special taxes on income above certain thresholds, and also directly regulate specific 
kinds of contests.  For example, attorneys in the United States can compete for contingency fees, but that type of 
tournament is often prohibited elsewhere. 
3 A review of this literature is provided in Falk and Fehr (2003) and Irlenbusch (2006). 
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take-all tournaments that might lead contest sponsors to seek different designs (Lazear, 1999; 
2000). Relative to piece rate wages, winner-take-all incentives may lead to greater variance in 
effort by players (Bull et al., 1987; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Eriksson et al., 2009) or 
sabotage among them (Munster, 2007; Chen, 2003; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008), and the 
outcomes are also affected by heterogeneity among players (Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; 
Harbring et al., 2007) as well as risk-sharing incentives (Krishna and Morgan, 1998). These 
considerations may discourage players from entry and distort performance, and thus reduce the 
total effort elicited in winner-take-all tournaments. Winner-take-all tournaments can also lead to 
a more unequal distribution of income (Frank and Cook, 1996). Moldovanu and Sela (2001) 
show that an alternative tournament design with multiple prizes elicits higher aggregate 
performance when the cost of effort is convex. One of their predictions is tested in a maze-
solving contest by Freeman and Gelber (2010), who find that the multiple-prize structure does 
result in higher aggregate performance than the winner-take-all payment.4 
This paper studies a new type of tournament: a proportional-prize contest, in which the 
prize is divided among participants in proportion to their achievement.5 This type of contest 
imitates some forms of competition among firms, for example, whose effort may be rewarded 
through a share of industry profit. Shared prizes can also be awarded in lobbying contests, such 
as the allocation of import quota licenses among competing importers (Krueger, 1974). 
Proportional contests may also be used within firms to reward workers, or as a type of 
procurement contract to elicit effort among suppliers. For example, poultry meat processors in 
                                                 
4 In a chosen effort experiment, Müller and Schotter (2007) also find a general support for the theory developed by 
Moldovanu and Sela (2001). However, they find that low ability players drop out significantly more than predicted. 
5 A proportional-prize tournament is in some ways similar to the type of contest modeled by Tullock (1980), in 
which a contestant’s effort influences their probability of winning a fixed prize. Making the prize itself proportional 
to effort allows us to separate risk concerns from contest design, as in Long and Vousden (1987), and allows direct 
comparison of winner-take-all versus proportional payments. Contests with proportional prizes are also related to the 
literature on profit sharing and labor productivity. For a review of this literature, see Weitzman and Kruse (1990). 
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the United States use proportional-payment competitions among their suppliers to spur cost 
reductions; Zheng and Vikuna (2007) study the case of one firm that switched to such contracts 
in 1984, and estimate the resulting increase in performance compared to the rank-order contests 
used previously.  
Comparing contest designs could offer both positive and normative lessons. In terms of 
positive economics, our results show differences in behavior under proportional as opposed to 
winner-take-all incentives. On the normative side, our results could guide the design of 
government-sponsored and philanthropic contests, including competitions for educational 
achievement, health-care improvements, and many kinds of technological innovations. In a 
review of the history of such contests, Masters and Delbecq (2008) suggest how proportional 
payments could encourage innovation targeted at agricultural innovations for low-income 
farmers, building on the opportunities sketched in Masters (2005). In general, contest sponsors 
could use proportional payments whenever the contest objective can be measured in a cardinal 
(rather than ordinal) manner. Where cardinal measurement is feasible, paying incrementally for 
increased achievement uses all of the available information about relative performance. In 
contrast, winner-take-all contests provide no incentives for any result other than winning.    
The potential value of using proportional prizes is in some ways similar to offering 
multiple prizes in a rank-order tournament, as studied by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Clark and 
Riis (1998), and Moldovanu and Sela (2001). The main difference is that, instead of an 
exogenously determined number of prizes and prize values, all players receive a payment which 
is endogenously determined by their individual efforts. Making proportional payments is also in 
some ways similar to the use of individual-specific handicaps to normalize incentives, as in 
Dickinson and Isaac (1998). Here the main difference is that each contestant endogenously 
 4 
competes against the average of all other contestants, with no need for the contest designer to 
evaluate entrants and impose handicaps.  
In this paper, we compare the performance of winner-take-all and proportional-payment 
contests in attracting entry and eliciting real efforts by actual contestants. Experiments that make 
participation endogenous, such as those of Ahn et al. (2009), help bridge the gap between 
behavior in an exogenously-imposed setting and the results when that situation arises outside the 
laboratory. Unlike Clark and Riis (1998) or Moldovanu and Sela (2001), we do not address the 
general theoretical optimality of these contests. Our experimental design focuses on 
heterogeneity among contestants, by offering subjects the opportunity to enter contests against 
opponents of varying skill levels. Our main result is that, given identical circumstances and the 
same amount of prize funds available, a proportional-prize tournament elicits higher entry rates 
and also higher total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament. The advantage of 
proportional payments is in attracting entry and eliciting effort even where there is at least one 
very strong player, whose presence in a winner-take-all setting can discourage other subjects 
from entering. This robustness to heterogeneity among potential competitors is a key dimension 
of contest performance, particularly for government and philanthropic contest sponsors who seek 
to attract diverse new entrants into the pursuit of a common objective.  
 
2. Experimental Design and Predictions 
2.1. Experimental Design 
We conduct an experiment with alternative payment incentives and compare performance 
in a real effort task: adding up sets of five randomly generated two-digit numbers by hand, as 
quickly as possible. Achievement is measured as the number of correct sums computed in a five 
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minute period, with no assistance other than a pen and paper (no calculators). This task is 
commonly used in the experimental literature (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Eriksson et al., 
2008) because it is easy to explain, and there is substantial variability in individual performance 
that is due partly to skill and partly to effort. The task does not require previous experience and 
high performance is not associated with a particular gender, socioeconomic background, or 
physical conditioning.6 
We study three payment conditions: piece-rate payments, a winner-take-all tournament, 
and a proportional-prize tournament. In the simple piece-rate (PR) condition, subjects receive 2 
experimental francs (equivalent to $0.40) per correct answer. In the winner-take-all (WTA) 
tournament, four subjects within a group compete for a prize of 100 francs ($20) paid to the one 
with the largest number of correct answers. In the proportional-prize (PP) tournament, four 
subjects within a group compete for a fraction of that same-sized prize, paid proportionally to all 
subjects according to their share of the group’s total number of correct answers. Note that the 
contestant group size is held fixed at four in both cases. 
The experiment used subjects drawn from the population of undergraduate students at 
Purdue University. Computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007) at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory. A total of 93 subjects 
participated in eight experimental sessions. Upon arrival the subjects were randomly assigned to 
a computer. The experiment proceeded in four parts. All subjects were given written instructions, 
available in the Appendix, at the beginning of each part, and an experimenter also read the 
instructions aloud. In the first part, subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar to Holt 
                                                 
6 We are not aware of any evidence suggesting any learning effects in adding numbers task. Moreover, the results of 
our experiment indicate that there is no such learning. 
 6 
and Laury (2002), for the purpose of eliciting subjects’ risk preferences.7 In the second part, each 
subject participated in one period of adding up numbers under the PR treatment. Performance 
was recorded and subjects received 2 experimental francs for each correct answer at the end of 
the experimental session. 
The third and fourth parts of the experiment involved WTA and PP contests. In two 
initial experimental sessions, employing a total of 24 subjects, each subject was randomly and 
exogenously assigned to compete in a WTA and a PP contest, in a varied sequence. In the next 
six sessions, employing a total of 69 subjects, each subject chose whether they wanted to enter a 
contest or be paid by PR.8 Our main focus is on the choices and performance of subjects during 
those endogenous-entry sessions, in which their contest opponents were explicitly and 
deliberately drawn from the pool of subjects in the previous sessions. Having each subject 
compete against the pre-recorded scores of earlier contestants ruled out strategic interactions 
among subjects within the same session, and also eliminates the potential influence of social 
preferences. If we had not used historical competitors, social preferences could have affected 
behavior because entry and greater effort impose a negative externality on contemporaneous 
competitors. Competing against pre-recorded, historical performances also allowed us to assign 
each subject to a four-player group in which their three competitors had higher or lower 
performance, thereby exogenously manipulating their relative skill.9 Before each entry decision, 
                                                 
7 Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff 
with certainty, while option B was a lottery with payoff of either $3 or zero. The series of 15 lotteries offered 
increasing odds of winning the $3 prize, from a 5% probability of winning to a 70% probability. The subject’s 
willingness to forego option A in favor of option B reflects their risk preferences, at roughly the same scale of 
wealth effect as the rest of our experiment. 
8 Four sessions had 12 subjects each, one session had 11 subjects, and one session had 10 subjects. The number of 
subjects in each session does not have to be a multiple of 4 since subjects compete against pre-recorded scores.  
9 Assigning subjects to pre-determined group compositions obviously limits our ability to draw general conclusions 
about the performance of WTA and PP. This design choice, however, allows us to avoid other potential problems 
that arise when group size and composition are formed endogenously. For example, this approach controls for 
(unobserved) beliefs about the skill and contest-induced effort intensity of potential competitors. It is also guided by 
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subjects were shown the actual piece-rate scores of the three previous subjects against whom 
they would compete, to inform their expectations about relative performance should they choose 
to enter. The opponents’ prerecorded performance in the WTA and PP contests was not revealed, 
however, until the subject’s performance was registered and their reward was computed.  
Each subject participated in six five-minute periods, three with the opportunity to enter a 
WTA contest and three with the opportunity to enter a PP contest. The sequence was varied so 
that half the sessions had WTA contests offered first, and half had PP offered first. In each of 
these six periods, subjects were matched with a fresh group of three other subjects, and informed 
that their competitors’ scores had been recorded from an experimental session run earlier in the 
year. The computer screen displayed the number of problems that each participant in the group 
had solved in their initial PR payment condition. Subjects could then choose to enter the contest 
available in that round (WTA or PP), or to be paid by PR for their own performance. We 
interpret the PR choice in this design as the opportunity cost of entry, which varies across 
subjects due to their heterogeneous skill. Non-entrants direct their effort to other activities, rather 
than whatever is being encouraged by the contest. At the end of each period the computer 
displayed the number of problems that each participant in the group solved correctly, and the 
earnings outcome of that period. 
At the end of each session, subjects were paid privately in cash: a show-up fee of $5, 
their earnings from the risk elicitation task in part one, the piece-rate payments in part two, and 
the contests or piece-rate payments chosen in parts three and four. From the risk-aversion part of 
the experiment, one of the 15 lottery decisions was randomly selected for payment. From the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the theoretical properties of these two tournaments, summarized in the next section, which imply different entry 
choices for participants with different relative ability. It would be interesting for future research to investigate 
alternative designs in which subjects compete against others who have selected into the tournament, or can choose 
which of the two tournament schemes to enter. 
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second part of the experiment in which all payments were by piece rate, subjects were paid for 
each correctly solved problem. For the third and fourth parts, subjects were paid their earnings 
from one randomly selected period in part three and one randomly selected period in part four. 
All earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 5 francs to $1. On average the subjects 
earned $22 including the show-up fee, and sessions lasted about 75 minutes.  
 
2.2. Predictions and Hypothesis 
Equilibrium effort in tournaments is typically modeled following Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) and Hillman and Riley (1989). The approach in Lazear and Rosen (1981) leads to a 
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Their model includes random noise and convex costs, 
so that predicted efforts equate marginal costs with marginal gains. Hillman and Riley (1989) 
assume that individual performance is a function of only effort, so the winner is simply the 
player who expends the highest effort. In that setting, there is no pure strategy equilibrium, but 
there is a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which players randomize their efforts 
over some interval.  
Entry into tournament contests has been addressed only recently. Fullerton and McAfee 
(1999) study a tournament where potential entrants have heterogeneous abilities and find that 
often the efficient tournament attracts only the two players with the highest abilities. Comparing 
different contests, Namoro and Mathews (2008) demonstrate that the high ability players do not 
necessarily participate in the contest with the largest prize, but may choose one with a lower 
prize instead.  
To derive our main hypothesis, we consider a simple contest in which 𝑛 risk-neutral 
players compete for a prize, normalized to 𝑣 = 1. Player 𝑖 selects irreversible effort 𝑒𝑖, with the 
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marginal cost of effort 
1
𝑐𝑖
. Assume that all players have different costs (abilities) and that 
marginal costs can be ordered as 𝑐1 ≥ 𝑐2 ≥ … ≥ 𝑐𝑛 > 0. The share of the prize (or probability of 
winning) for player 𝑖 is defined by a contest success function: 
𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) =
𝑒𝑖
𝑟
∑ 𝑒𝑗
𝑟𝑛
𝑗=1
.         (1) 
where, 𝑟 is the parameter which describes the degree of discrimination. The contest is perfectly 
discriminatory when 𝑟 = ∞, i.e. the player with the highest effort receives the entire prize 
(winner-take-all contest). When 𝑟 = 1, each player receives the portion of the prize according to 
the relative performance (proportional-prize).10 The expected payoff for a risk-neutral player 𝑖 is 
equal to the expected prize (𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) times the prize valuation 1) minus cost of effort, 
1
𝑐𝑖
𝑒𝑖: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) −  
1
𝑐𝑖
𝑒𝑖.        (2) 
The Nash equilibrium depends on the parameter 𝑟. For 𝑟 = 1, the derivation of the 
unique pure strategy equilibrium can be found in Fang (2002). In such a case, the equilibrium 
effort for player 𝑖 is given by: 
𝑒𝑖
𝑃𝑃 =
𝑛−1
∑
1
𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−
1
𝑐𝑖
(
𝑛−1
∑
1
𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)
2
.        (3) 
For 𝑟 = ∞, the player who expends the highest effort wins the entire prize. The 
equilibrium in such a winner-take-all contest is quite different from the proportional-prize 
contest (Baye et al., 1996). In equilibrium all weaker players with marginal costs above 
1
𝑐3
 
expend effort of zero with probability one. The two strongest players use mixed strategies, which 
                                                 
10 Technically speaking, the winner-take-all contest is an all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989) and the 
proportional-prize contest is a lottery contest of Tullock (1980). Che and Gale (2000) provide a link between an all-
pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989) and a winner-take-all tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981).  
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are characterized by cumulative distribution functions that describe the distribution of efforts on 
the support 𝑒 ∈ [0, 𝑐2], 
𝐹1
𝑊𝑇𝐴(𝑒) = 𝑒/𝑐2   and   𝐹2
𝑊𝑇𝐴(𝑒) = (𝑐1 − 𝑐2 + 𝑒)/𝑐1    (4) 
It is easy to verify that the expected payoffs (2) are positive for all players participating in 
the proportional-prize contest and the expected payoff is positive only for the strongest player in 
the winner-take-all contest (Baye et al., 1993, 1996; Fang, 2002; Ryvkin, 2007).11 Therefore, if 
players have an outside option, as they do in our experiment, then the low ability players should 
always choose not to enter the winner-take-all contest and instead choose the outside option. The 
highest ability player will choose to participate in the winner-take-all contest if the outside option 
is relatively small. We thus hypothesize that low ability players will enter PP significantly more 
than WTA, while there should be no significant difference in entry decisions of high ability 
players. Note that our experimental design tests this hypothesis directly, in that each potential 
entrant’s outside option involves exactly the same skills and efforts as the tournament, but is 
rewarded on a piece-rate basis instead of PP or WTA prizes. 
Hypothesis: Subjects with a relatively low ability enter PP significantly more than WTA, 
while there is no difference in entry for high ability subjects. 
 
3. Results 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of performance for the two preliminary sessions when 
subjects were placed exogenously in each type of contest. The primary purpose of those 
preliminary sessions was to obtain some historical performance scores against which our subjects 
would compete in the main experiment. There are two noticeable features of the data. First, the 
                                                 
11 It is possible that some players, whose costs are sufficiently high, may decide not to participate in the contest and 
instead expend the effort of 𝑒𝑖
𝑃𝑃 = 0. For specific condition under which such situation may occur see Fang (2002).  
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average number of problems solved by subjects in the WTA and PP is very similar (13.4 versus 
13.6), which indicates that both tournaments generate similar incentives for subjects’ 
performance. Second, both histograms in Figure 1 indicate substantial variability in individual 
performance (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Eriksson et al., 2008). This highlights an important 
feature of this real effort task: subjects have different abilities and therefore they may have 
different incentives to enter tournaments. 
Figure 1 – Distribution of Performance with Exogenous on Tournament Entry
 
 
3.1. Aggregate Performance 
Table 1 summarizes the number of entry decisions, the total number of problems solved 
correctly, and the total number of problems attempted in all treatments, conditional on whether 
the subject chose to enter the tournament or accepted the outside option of a piece-rate payment. 
A total of 85 entries were made when tournament payoffs were WTA, and jointly these subjects 
solved 1077 problems correctly. By contrast, a total of 129 entries occurred with PP 
tournaments, and the total number of problems they solved was 1509. Total achievement in the 
tournament was thus 40 percent larger with PP payment than in WTA.  
Result 1: PP attracts more subjects and has higher total performance than WTA. 
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The rightmost column of Table 1 indicates that the WTA contest tended to attract more 
able subjects. On average, the WTA entrants solved one more problem than the PP entrants. This 
8.5 percent advantage in individual performance for WTA is noticeably smaller than the 40 
percent advantage in aggregate total performance for the PP tournament. Even more importantly, 
as we show in the next subsection the PP contest attracts entry by high performers at a 
(statistically) equivalent rate as the WTA contest. The difference in individual performance 
arises only because the WTA format discourages entry of relatively weaker performers. 
For certain applications, such as a labor market context in which managers may be 
selecting between alternative incentive schemes to motivate employees, the overall effort 
performance comparison should include the PR effort. By this measure (labeled “Combined” in 
Table 1) the two tournaments have nearly identical achievement. For our research objective to 
evaluate the tournaments’ ability to redirect effort to specific activities by attracting entry into a 
contest, the most relevant performance metric is the problems solved when participating in the 
tournament. 
  Table 1 – Conditional Statistics in PR, WTA and PP (Endogenous-Entry Sessions) 
 
Total Number of Average Number 
of Correctly 
Solved Problems  
Entry 
Observations 
Correctly Solved  
Problems 
Attempted 
 Problems 
PR 69 661 893 9.6 
WTA 85 1077 1342 12.7 
PR (WTA) 122 1440 1796 11.8 
Combined 207 2517 3138 12.2 
PP 129 1509 1912 11.7 
PR (PP) 78 1071 1281 13.7 
Combined 207 2580 3193 12.5 
Note: The first row shows unconditional PR results, required for all 69 subjects 
before the contests were offered. The third and sixth rows show subjects’ PR 
performance, conditional on having declined participation in the contest. 
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3.2. Entry and Individual Performance 
The overall achievement advantage of the PP tournament depends on subjects’ decision 
to enter the tournament, which in turn depends on what they believe about their relative 
performance vis-à-vis the competitors they would face. We assigned subjects to three kinds of 
matches. In one third of cases, subjects were placed into a group with a “superstar” contestant, 
defined as a subject whose PR scores were among the highest in the preliminary sessions. In 
another third of the cases, subjects were placed in a group of relatively weak contestants, whose 
PR scores were somewhat lower than the subject’s own initial PR score. In the remaining third 
they were placed in a group of relatively strong contestants. 
Table 2 – Fraction of Subjects Entering the Tournament 
Matching Performance in PR by other contestants 
 
Fraction of Entry 
  Maximum of others Average of others   WTA PP 
Against Superstar 22.0 11.5   0.07 0.51 
Against Weaker Group 8.4 7.4 
 
0.91 0.93 
Against Stronger Group 16.4 14.1   0.25 0.43 
Total 15.6 11.0   0.41 0.62 
 
Table 2’s first two columns show the matches, in terms of the maximum and the mean of 
the three other contestants’ pre-recorded scores. The second two columns show entry decisions, 
in terms of the fraction of subjects who chose to compete under each tournament option. The 
most dramatic difference is seen when subjects know they face a superstar. In those cases, only 7 
percent of subjects chose to enter contests with WTA payments, whereas 51 percent chose to 
enter when the same prize amount was to be paid proportionally. When matched against weaker 
groups, more than 90 percent of subjects entered both types of contests. When matched against a 
stronger group (but no superstar), 25 percent entered the WTA contests and 43 percent entered 
the contests with proportional payment. In total subjects enter 62 percent of the PP contests but 
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only 41 percent of the WTA contests. 
The entry decision could be influenced by learning over time, and could vary across 
different types of subjects. Table 3 reports results of various probit random effect models to 
evaluate this influence. Each one tests the influence of PP compared to WTA payment on 
subjects’ decision to enter the contest. The regressions control for learning using the time trend 
1/period and a dummy-variable controlling for the sequence in which the treatments were run. 
Specification (1) uses all subjects in the endogenous entry condition, while specifications (2) to 
(5) are based on different subsets of the data. Controlling for the time trend and sequence, the 
probability of entering the contest is significantly higher when payment is PP rather than WTA. 
This increase in entry likelihood for the PP contest is especially pronounced for the subjects 
whose performance in the preliminary PR rounds was the lowest of their contest comparison 
group (specification 3) or below the group’s average (specification 5). No significant difference 
in entry likelihood is found for the subjects whose performance is the highest or higher than 
average (specifications 2 and 4). This finding supports the main hypothesis of this study. 
 
Table 3 – Entry into PP and WTA Contests by Initial Performance 
Condition 
Performance in PR treatment 
All is Max is Min is >= Mean is < Mean 
Dependent variable, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Entry into Tournament RE probit RE probit RE probit RE probit RE probit 
PP dummy 0.54** -0.15 0.60* 0.26 0.83** 
  [1 if PP treatment] (0.13) (0.40) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) 
1/period 0.44* -0.87 0.55 0.52 0.37 
  [time trend] (0.22) (0.70) (0.41) (0.32) (0.32) 
sequence dummy 0.06 0.37 0.02 0.04 0.11 
  [1 if WTA is before PP] (0.13) (0.42) (0.25) (0.18) (0.18) 
constant -0.52** 2.00** -1.02** -0.56* -0.52* 
  (0.18) (0.63) (0.36) (0.25) (0.25) 
Observations 414 94 146 198 216 
Number of subjects 69 50 68 33 36 
Note: All results are from probit models with random subject effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Asterisks indicate * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
 15 
Result 2: PP encourages significantly more entry among low ability subjects than WTA 
without discouraging the entry of high ability subjects. 
Another question of interest is whether subjects’ performance depends on the type of the 
contest or the contestants with whom they were matched. To address this we estimated several 
random effect models with individual subject effects. The estimation results are shown in Table 
4. The estimates in column (1) are based on the initial sessions with exogenous, compulsory 
contest entry, and the other columns report estimates for those who chose to enter the contest.12 
The dependent variable is the number of correctly solved problems (performance) and the 
independent variables are the treatment dummy variable and controls for the time trend and 
learning. The conclusion from all specifications is that subject’s performance is not influenced 
by the type of the contest, since the PP dummy variable never even approaches statistical 
significance. 
Result 3: Individual performance is not significantly different in PP and WTA 
tournaments, regardless whether the entry is exogenous or endogenous. 
Results 1, 2, and 3 can be summarized as follows: as long as potential entrants expect to 
face capable competitors, a proportional-prize tournament elicits higher entry rates and higher 
total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament, by avoiding the discouragement effect 
associated with contestant heterogeneity without otherwise altering individual performance. 
 
                                                 
12 We also estimated an alternative set of models following Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation procedure to 
account for the endogenous selection into the tournament. In the first stage, we estimate the probit model as in Table 
3, where the dependent variable is whether or not the subject chose the contest payment scheme. In the second stage 
we use the results from the first stage to estimate the determinants of performance as in Table 4. Gender and the 
subject’s estimated degree of risk-aversion were used as the identifying variables responsible for the selection effect, 
based on theoretical predictions (for risk) and previous research documenting different tournament entry rates for 
men and women (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). To conserve space we do not report these estimation results, 
however, since they are very similar to the results reported in Table 4. We also estimated specifications that included 
the abilities (initial piece rate performance) of the competitors, and this revealed that performance does not depend 
on competitors’ abilities. 
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Table 4 – Performance in PP and WTA Contests 
 
 Endogenous Contest Entry (columns 2-6) 
Condition 
 Performance in PR treatment 
Exogenous 
Entry 
All is Max is Min 
is >= 
Mean 
is < Mean 
Dependent variable, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Performance RE RE RE RE RE RE 
PP dummy 0.22 -0.04 -0.09 -0.62 0.21 -0.26 
  [1 if PP treatment] (0.30) (0.22) (0.31) (0.53) (0.30) (0.30) 
1/period -0.50 -0.31 -2.27** -0.91 -0.91 0.05 
  [time trend] (0.53) (0.40) (0.75) (0.91) (0.60) (0.52) 
sequence dummy -2.22 0 -0.09 -0.21 -0.11 -0.28 
  [1 if WTA is before PP] (1.96) (0.82) (0.96) (1.01) (1.00) (0.76) 
constant 14.83** 12.53** 14.85** 12.25** 15.29** 10.35** 
  (1.43) (0.66) (0.86) (1.00) (0.86) (0.65) 
Observations 144 214 87 55 92 122 
Number of subjects 24 69 49 36 33 36 
Note: All results shown are estimated using random subject effects. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Asterisks indicate * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
Figure 2 – Distribution of Payoffs under WTA and PP
 
Note also that, by design, the proportional-prize tournament reduces earnings inequality 
relative to the winner-take-all tournament. Figure 2 displays the distribution of payoffs for the 
WTA and PP tournaments, including PR payoffs received by subjects who chose not to enter the 
contests. The stark win-or-lose structure of payoffs in the WTA tournament results in a few 
winners who entered and earned all 100 francs, while a larger fraction of entrants lose and are 
left with nothing. The contrast with the distribution of payoffs in the PP tournaments is striking. 
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The average payoff for the WTA periods (32.7) is higher than in the PP periods (26.1), but the 
payoff standard deviation is almost five times higher in the WTA (34.2 compared to 7.3). 
 
3.3. Entry Decisions 
The decision to enter a contest depends on the outside option and the payoff from entry. 
In our experiment, the outside option is a piece-rate payment (PR): subjects receive a relatively 
safe reward that depends only on their own performance. The payoff from entry depends on 
performance relative to other contestants.  
Table 5 examines subjects’ entry choices, separately considering each type of 
tournament, using a series of random effect probit models. The significantly positive coefficient 
on the subject’s own PR score in model (1) indicates that higher ability subjects enter WTA 
contests more frequently than do low ability subjects, whereas no such skill selection effect 
appears in model (2) for PP contests. Opponents’ skills also matter. With WTA payment, the 
maximum_other score discourages entry, whereas in the PP contest the average_other score 
discourages entry. This result is consistent with other players’ actual influence on the entrant’s 
payoff based on these different contest structures. Although risk-averse subjects enter WTA less 
frequently on average, the coefficient on a risk_averse dummy variable is not statistically 
significant. As expected, no correlation exists between risk-aversion and entry into the PP 
contests. Consistent with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), the male dummy coefficient indicates 
that men enter contests more frequently than women. This entry difference is only statistically 
significant in the PP tournament, which had the larger number of entrants. 
To determine whether subjects’ entry decisions are optimal, we need to model their 
expectations of their contest payoff conditional on the information they have when making this  
 18 
 Table 5 – Entry into Different Contest Formats by Initial Own and Competitor Abilities    
Dependent variable  
Entry into Tournament  
WTA PP WTA+PP 
Specification 
(1) (2) (3) 
RE probit RE probit RE probit 
own 0.17** -0.01 0.16** 
  [own piece rate performance] (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
maximum_other -0.20** -0.05 -0.19** 
  [max of the other three piece rates] (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
average_other -0.08 -0.19** -0.08 
  [average of the other three piece rates] (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
PP dummy 
  
1.29 
  [1 if PP treatment] 
  
(0.67) 
own x PP dummy 
  
-0.17** 
  [own if PP] 
  
(0.05) 
maximum_other x PP dummy 
  
0.15** 
  [maximum_other if PP] 
  
(0.04) 
average_other x PP dummy 
  
-0.11 
  [average_other if PP] 
  
(0.07) 
1/period 0.23 0.37 0.29 
  [time trend] (0.44) (0.36) (0.27) 
male dummy 0.24 0.59** 0.44** 
  [1 if male] (0.26) (0.21) (0.16) 
risk_averse dummy -0.17 0.00 -0.07 
  [1 if # of safe options A > 8] (0.26) (0.21) (0.16) 
sequence dummy 0.4 -0.01 0.16 
  [1 if WTA is before PP] (0.27) (0.21) (0.16) 
constant 2.07** 2.81** 1.69** 
 
(0.63) (0.54) (0.50) 
Observations 207 207 414 
Number of subjects 69 69 69 
Note: All results shown are RE probit estimates, with subjects as the random effect. 
Significance levels are: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 
 
entry choice. At the time of their entry decisions, subjects know the initial piece rate 
performances for themselves and for the three other contestants with whom they have been 
matched. From that, they can observe the difference between their own initial piece rate score 
and the highest of the others (for a WTA contest), and the difference between their own and the 
average of the others (for a PP contest). These comparisons would influence an optimizing 
subject’s beliefs about their expected payoff from entry. In making that forecast, a subject might 
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also consider how they and others are likely to perform in subsequent rounds given those initial 
piece rate scores. To ensure that these predictions turn out to be unbiased, we model subjects’ 
beliefs using rational expectations by regressing the payoff each subject would actually have 
earned through contest entry in each round on their own and their competitors’ initial piece rate 
performances.  
For example, before his first entry choice subject 25 knew that his own piece rate 
performance was 14 correctly solved problems, and that his three potential competitors solved 
13, 15 and 21 problems on their initial piece rate task. It turns out that this subject then solved 20 
problems correctly in the following period, while his three rivals solved 20, 20, and 23 problems. 
If those results had occurred in a PP contest, the subject would have earned a share 
20/(20+20+20+23)=0.24 of the 100 prize, or 24 experimental francs. If he had not entered, he 
would have earned the piece-rate payment of 2x20=40 experimental francs. For our regression, 
we calculate the payoffs that would have been realized in the PP contest for all 207 potential 
entry choices, and combine them in an OLS regression of PP payoffs on the piece rate 
information available at the time of the entry choice. The coefficient estimates from this 
regression and initial piece rate performances tell us that subject 25 in this example period would 
have an expected payoff of 22.54 experimental francs from PP contest entry, whereas with non-
entry he would have earned an expected payoff of 32.27 experimental francs. For this period, an 
entry decision would not have been optimal. 
We employ a similar calculation to compute expected earnings from entering WTA 
contests, except that we use a logit regression since the dependent variable is a binary indicator 
for whether a subject would have actually won. The model estimates indicate the probability of 
winning based on piece rate information available at the time of the entry choice, which we 
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multiply by the prize value (100) to determine expected profits from entry. For example, using 
this logit model subject 25 would have expected to win his third potential WTA contest (which 
was against some relatively weak opponents) with probability 0.841, leading to an expected 
contest payoff of 84.1. This exceeds what he would have expected to earn (30.97) from a PR 
payment, making entry optimal in that period.  
These estimates of expected contest payoffs reveal that subjects have made correct entry 
choices a substantial majority of the time in both contests, with 86.05 percent correct in the WTA 
contest and 68.6 percent correct in the PP contest. There is a bias towards over-entry rather than 
under-entry in both contests. Subjects incorrectly enter the contest when an unbiased expectation 
suggests that they would have earned more from the PR in 36 percent of their entries, but they 
incorrectly stay out of the contest in only 8.5 percent of their non-entry choices. Thus, similar to 
previous research (e.g., Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), subjects tend to overestimate their chances 
of relative success and enter too frequently into tournaments. 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) document that when choosing between compensation 
schemes men selected tournament compensation twice as often as women.13 We find a smaller 
but still significant difference. Overall men selected the tournament 56 percent of the time, 
compared to 45 percent of the time for women.14 One possible explanation is that women enter 
the tournament less than men because they tend to be more risk-averse (Eckel and Grossman, 
                                                 
13 While several studies replicate the result that women are less willing to enter contests (e.g., Niederle et al., 2008; 
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2005), this should not be interpreted as evidence that women are on average not as 
competitive as men. In fact, the majority of studies in the auction literature that consider gender effects find that 
women overbid more than men, suggesting more competitive behavior once in a competition (Chen et al., 2005; 
Ham and Kagel, 2006; Casari et al., 2007; Charness and Levin, 2009). Similar over-bidding behavior is found in 
studies of lottery contests (Sheremeta, 2010). 
14 Wilcoxon two-tailed p-value=0.02. This smaller gender effect does not contradict Niederle and Vesterlund’s 
(2007) result, since many differences besides the subject pool exist between the two experimental environments 
even though both feature the same real-effort task. For example, in our study we manipulate subjects’ information 
about the relative abilities of their opponents; subjects compete for a single (total $20) prize rather than a piece rate 
prize; and they had no knowledge about the gender of their competitors. 
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2002; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). In our experiment 60 percent of 
women and 52 percent of men are classified as risk-averse, but this difference is not significant 
(Wilcoxon p-value=0.52). Furthermore, the Table 5 estimates control for risk-aversion and yet 
still find a significant gender difference on entry. Note also that the gender difference for entry is 
larger and is statistically significant for the less risky PP contest. Thus, it appears that some 
alternative explanation for this gender difference, such as greater overconfidence among men as 
suggested by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), may be behind the more frequent entry by men. 
Our analysis of over- and under-entry summarized in the previous paragraph does not reveal any 
gender differences for the WTA contest; however it does indicate a marginally significant 
difference for the PP contest, indicating less frequent entry by women when the contest provides 
higher expected profit than the PR payment.15 
 
4. Conclusions 
McKinsey and Company (2009) describe how philanthropic and government-sponsored 
contests have become increasingly widespread instruments used to elicit efforts targeting many 
social goals and public goods. Almost all of these contests are winner-take-all in nature. Market 
incentives may also resemble such contests: in a book titled The Winner-Take-All Society, Frank 
and Cook (1996) argue that in the 1980s and early 1990s the U.S. economy became increasingly 
dominated by a stark win-or-lose structure of payoffs. Such “high powered incentives” are 
sometimes desirable, and are sometimes inevitable, but in some cases offering rewards to more 
winners might lead to preferable outcomes. That possibility has been explored in theoretical and 
                                                 
15 When the PP contest offered subjects a higher expected profit than PR payment, men actually entered the contest 
87 percent of the time (in 62 out of 71 such cases), whereas women actually entered only 70 percent of the time (in 
19 of 27 such cases). This gender difference is marginally significant (p-value=0.052), when the entry choice for 
these cases is modeled as a logit function of gender and a time trend, for the subset of cases where the PP contest has 
a higher expected profit. 
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experimental studies such as Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006), Che and Gale (2003), Müller 
and Schotter (2009), and Sheremeta (2010). 
This paper introduces a new type of tournament in which every contest entrant wins a 
prize, the value of which is strictly proportional to their share of total achievement. We find that 
such a proportional-prize contest elicits higher entry rates and thus higher total performance in 
the contest than an equivalent winner-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize tournament 
performs better because of greater participation by subjects with relatively low ability, with no 
change in the entry rates or performance of high ability subjects. Moreover, the proportional-
prize tournament also substantially reduces earnings inequality relative to the winner-take-all 
tournament. 
Our experiment varies the relative skill of each subject by exogenously matching them 
with prerecorded scores from a pool of previous competitors. This isolates the impact of relative 
skills, to test whether a proportional-prize design can overcome the discouraging effect of 
heterogeneity in winner-take-all contests. Future work might consider other important issues, 
such as strategic interaction among contestants, or the effect of voluntary entry on subsequent 
performance. Regarding relative skills, consistent with theory we find that subjects are indeed 
discouraged from entering winner-take-all contests when they face a single much stronger (or 
luckier) potential opponent, whereas with proportional prizes their entry decision is influenced 
by the average performance of all other competitors.  
At least for this laboratory contest environment, the proportional-prize contest is just as 
effective as the winner-take-all contest in identifying top performers because they enter both 
contests at the same rate and perform equally well conditional on entry. If a contest sponsor, 
employer or governing body has the additional goal to raise total aggregate performance - rather 
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than just identifying the top performer - our results suggest that the higher entry rates in the 
proportional prize contest give it a distinct advantage over the winner-take-all format. 
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